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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW and
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in reducing by nearly 50% the amount of
attorney fees awarded to Appellants/Defendants where such fees were supported by
affidavit and detailed billing records and where the trial court expressly found that such
fees were reasonable.
Standard of Review: The amount and reasonableness of a trial court's award of
attorney fees is ordinarily a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given set of facts, i.e., it is a mixed
question of law and fact. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1996);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine,
830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 164 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988). SeeRushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, | 1 , 977 P.2d 1201; Taylor
ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f6, 977 P.2d 479.
However, the sufficiency of a trial court's findings that support an award of attorney
fees is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms,
1999 UT App 207 ^[9. Although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in
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determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award "must be based on the
evidence and supported by findings of fact." See id.; Salmon v. Davis County,
916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996).

2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants'/Defendants'
motion for additional attorney fees and costs incurred in collecting the original judgment
against Appellees/Plaintiffs, particularly when Appellees/Plaintiffs filed no objections to
such motion.
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207 f 9 {citing
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This is a breach of contract case that flowed from prior litigation between the parties.1
After more than three years of hostile and bitter litigation, the parties entered into a

1

The parties are many. They include a corporation, Custom Steel Fabrication,
and six individuals, all of whom were related to each other. The Appellants in this appeal
represent only four of the individuals. Custom Steel and two individuals, Heidi Bishop
and Mark Garamendi, were dismissed from the case. For convenience, the three
dismissed parties are referred to herein as "Custom Steel, et alT Following their
dismissal, the trial court awarded to them $1,330 in attorney fees, the exact amount
requested by their counsel. (R. 192-95, 204, 208.)
-2-

Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement").2 However, despite the terms of the
Agreement, Mr. Blevins concocted a plan to thwart the Agreement's benefits to
Custom Steel, et al.
Mr. Blevins attempted to divert to his friend the very funds that he was to turn over to
Custom Steel, et al He did this by instigating with a friend of his an action to garnish the
funds that he was holding for Custom Steel, et al
During the garnishment action, Mr. Blevins' plan was defeated. In the process,
however, Custom Steel, et al incurred substantial legal fees. As a result, Custom Steel,
et al commenced an action against Mr. Blevins3 for breach of the Agreement and to
recover the legal fees incurred in defending against the contrived garnishment action.
In the action brought by Custom Steel, et al, Appellees failed to timely file a
counterclaim, and their belated request to do so was denied. Undaunted, Appellees
commenced a separate action (the same underlying action which is the subject of this
appeal) against Custom Steel, et al and added the four Appellants, claiming breach of the
Agreement. Early in this action, the trial court dismissed Custom Steel, et al, based on

2

In 1995, Mr, Blevins loaned money to Custom Steel Fabrication at a 48%
interest rate. Following default by Custom Steel and judgment against it, Mr. Blevins
seized equipment from Custom Steel. During the seizure, he allegedly assaulted
Heidi Bishop and wrongfully seized personal property belonging to her and
Mr. Garamendi. Further litigation ensued. The Agreement was to resolve all claims
between the parties.
3

Although Mr. Blevins was the principal actor, his wife was included in the action
because she was also a party to the Agreement.
-3-

Rule 13, Utah R. Civ. P., and based on the doctrine of res judicata. (R. 173-75.) The
remaining defendants, comprising the four Appellants herein, were then left to defend
against Appellees' four causes of action.
Course of Proceedings and Relevant Facts:
After filing multiple motions for summary judgment on each cause of action,
Appellants eventually prevailed on all causes of action. (R. 484-86.), attached hereto as
Addendum 1. Appellants also defeated a motion for summary judgment brought by
Appellees. Id.
All causes of action brought by Appellees represented claims that Appellants
breached the Agreement, (R. 1-13.), which Agreement provides attorney fees to the
prevailing party. (R. 288, 485 ^|4.) Since Appellants prevailed on all causes of action, the
trial court awarded attorney fees to Appellants. Addendum 1 at 2 ^4. Counsel for
Appellants submitted affidavits of fees, (R. 441-44,465-67.), attached hereto as
Addendum 2, including detailed billing records. (R. 445-53.), attached hereto as
Addendum 3.
Without challenging any specific items contained in such billing records, Appellees
opposed the amount of fees. (R. 460-64.), attached hereto as Addendum 4. In support of
their objection, Appellees submitted a single affidavit by a practicing attorney who
opined that fees in these types of cases should not exceed 50% of the amount in
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controversy, which, based solely on information from Appellees, he was led to believe to
be approximately $7,000.4 (R. 455-58.), attached hereto as Addendum 5.
Although Appellees requested a hearing on the issue of attorney fees, Addendum 4,
the trial court failed to hold any hearing on the issue of fees. Instead, the only evidence in
the record in support of or in opposition to an award of attorney fees, as they relate to
Issue No. 1, are the following documents:
1. Affidavit and Amended Affidavit of counsel for Appellants
(R. 441-44, 465-67.), Addendum 2;
2. Detailed billing records of Appellants' counsel (R. 445-53.), Addendum 3;
3. Appellees' memorandum of objections. (R. 460-64), Addendum 4; and
4. Affidavit of a local attorney, Brent Stephens. (R. 455-58.), Addendum 5.

The amended affidavit of Appellants' counsel requests fees in the amount of $11,538.
Addendum 2. Without entering any findings to support a reduction in fees, the trial court
entered an award of attorney fees in the amount of $6,050. Addendum 1 at 3. More
puzzling, the trial court's final order and judgment included the following paragraph:
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor
of Defendants on the First Cause of Action and now by granting

4

Although Appellees' Complaint specifies some dollar amounts for damages,
Attorney Brent Stephens states in his affidavit that he was informed that the amount in
controversy was approximately $7,000. (R. 457 f 9.) However, prior to his affidavit,
Appellees had claimed in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment damages in the
amount of $16,620. (R. 274.)
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summary judgment on all remaining causes of action, and after
reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by Defendants and
finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and . . .
Addendum 1 at 3 {emphasis added)

Entry of final judgment was made on February 1, 2003, ("Judgment"). Based on the
trial court's substantial reduction in the amount of attorney fees and based on the trial
court's failure to provide any findings to support such reduction, Appellants then filed on
February 27, 2002 their Notice of Appeal (R. 491-92.)
Appellants also began efforts to collect the Judgment from Appellees.5 Appellees
rebuffed all attempts to collect the Judgment by first filing a Motion to Quash
Supplemental Order and then submitting to Appellants a formal request for discovery.6
Finally, Appellees deposited with the Clerk of the trial court an amount equal to the
Judgment amount and simultaneously requested a stay to prevent collection of the
Judgment.7 There was no legal basis for Appellees' request for a stay because their
5

After February 1, 2002, the date when the Final and Judgment was entered,
Appellants filed the following: Order in Supplemental Proceedings (3/8/2002)
(R. 495-97.); Application for Garnishment (4/4/2002) (R. 513-14.); Motion to Augment
Judgment (4/12/2002) (R. 528-29.); and First Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs
Relating to the Collection of Judgment (4/12/2002) (R. 530-36.).
6

In response to Appellees' attempts to defeat collection of the Judgment,
Appellants filed the following: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash
Supplemental Order (3/29/2002) (R. 500-04.); and Motion for Protective Order
(4/8/2002) (R. 517-18.);
7

Appellees filed a Motion to Quash Supplemental Order (4/1/2003) (R. 506-511.)
and a Notice of Supersedeas Bond (4/11/2002) (R. 526-27.) At the supp order hearing,
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deposit could not be considered a supersedeas bond. (R. 546.) Since Appellees had not
filed an appeal, the trial court denied the request. Id. The trial court then entered an order
entitled Order Forfeiting Bond. The Order permitted Appellants to take from the Clerk of
the trial court the Appellees' deposit. (R. 537-39.)
Upon collecting the Judgment, Appellants requested additional attorney fees and
costs that were incurred during the collection process. (R. 528-36.) The amount of such
fees and costs requested by Appellants is $2,107. Id. The trial court denied without
comment Appellants' request.8 (R. 628.) Appellants then filed a second Notice of Appeal
(R. 630.) and subsequently requested this Court to consolidate both appeals. That request
was granted.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After Appellants prevailed through summary judgment on all causes of action, the
trial court first reviewed the affidavit of attorney fees that was filed by counsel for
Appellants. In its Final Order and Judgment, the trial court found such fees to be
reasonable. Although Appellants' affidavit of fees requested $11,538, the trial court

Judge Medley, sitting for Judge Dever, ordered a $200 bail on a bench warrant for
Mr. Blevins because of Mr. Blevins' failure to appear as ordered. (R. 575-76.)
8

The trial court "denied" Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment by filing an
unsigned order and pasting a note on it with the word "Denied" written on the order.
(R. 581.) To permit an appeal, Appellants needed a signed order. Over a three month
period of time, Counsel for Appellants wrote two letters to Judge Dever requesting him to
sign an order denying Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment. (R. 626-27.)
-7-

entered only $6,050. However, the trial court failed to make any findings in support of
such a reduction. This is clear error. See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207 ^[9.
Examination of all evidence in support of a reduction could not reasonably lead to a
reduction of fees. Appellees filed objections and supported them with an affidavit from a
local attorney. However, such attorney was not qualified as an expert and his credibility
is undermined because he failed to support his opinion with any law. Appellees contend
that an award of attorney fees should not exceed 50% of the amount in controversy. Such
contention is without any basis in law, is actually contrary to law, and Appellees cite no
rule or law to support their contention.
Even if the amount of controversy were relevant, Appellees' purported expert
admitted that his information about the case came solely from Appellees and their
counsel. He was informed that the amount in controversy was $7,000, but Appellees had
previously claimed more than $16,000 in damages in their Motion for Summary
Judgment.
In a similar manner, the trial court denied Appellants' request for $2,107 in attorney
fees and costs for post-judgment collection activities. Again, the trial court failed to make
any findings of fact to support such a denial. And again, Appellees made similar
arguments against the award of any fees.
For both Issue No. 1 and 2, the trial court was in error based on its failure to make
any findings to support its reduction of fees on Issue No. 1 and its denial of postjudgment fees and costs on Issue No. 2.
-8-

ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1:
Whether the trial court erred in reducing by nearly 50% the amount of
attorney fees awarded to Appellants where such fees were supported by
affidavit and detailed billing records and where the trial court expressly
found that such fees were reasonable.

I.

The trial court erred when it reduced Appellants' attorney fees without first
entering any findings of fact to support such a reduction.
Appellants prevailed on all causes of action, and the trial court correctly awarded

attorney fees to them based on the attomey-fee-provision contained in the underlying
Agreement and on which this action was solely based. Addendum 1. Appellants' counsel
submitted to the trial court an affidavit of attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$11,538. Addendum 2. His affidavit was supported by detailed billing records.
Addendum 3.
Concurrently with the affidavit and billing records, Appellants also submitted a
proposed Final Order and Judgment. Addendum 1. Appellees opposed the amount of fees
and submitted a memorandum of objections, Addendum 4, and an affidavit by
Brent Stephens, a local practicing attorney. Addendum 5.
No hearing was held by the trial court, although Appellees demanded an evidentiary
hearing. Addendum 4. Instead, the trial court entered a Final Order and Judgment after
-9-

first modifying the proposed Order that Appellants had submitted. The trial deleted
several lines of text, including partial lines. Addendum 1.
The trial court left intact the following text in the Final Order and Judgment:
Since the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorney
fees to the prevailing party, Defendants are determined to be the
prevailing party and are therefore entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
Addendum 1 at 2.

The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor
of Defendants on the First Cause of Action and now by granting
summary judgment on all remaining causes of action, and after
reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by Defendants and
finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs'
Motions for Summary Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth
Causes of Action be granted and that Plaintiffs5 Complaint be dismissed
in its entirety with prejudice and on its merits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants be awarded their
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $6,050 .
Addendum 1 at 3.
Although the affidavit of attorney fees and costs, supported by detailed billing
records, requested $11,538, the trial court entered the figure of $6,050 as shown above.
The trial court provided no explanation nor made any findings to support such a
reduction. This Court should, therefore, review the sufficiency of the trial court's
findings under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms,
1999 UT App 20719. Under such standard, this Court should find that the trial court's
-10-

reduction was in error, since the trial court totally failed to support its reduction in fees
with any findings of fact. See id.; Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893
(Utah 1996).
Not only did the trial court completely fail to support its reduction in fees, it acted
contrary to its own ruling. The trial court found Appellants' attorney fees to be
reasonable when it ruled that
The Court,... after reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees
submitted by Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, . . .
Addendum 1 at 3.

The plain meaning of the trial court's ruling is that it first reviewed the affidavit of
attorney fees submitted by Appellants and then it found those fees to be reasonable.
There can be no other logical meaning given to the trial court's ruling. Once the trial
court found the attorney fees to be reasonable, it had no basis to reduce those fees from
$11,538 down to $6,050, unless it supported such reduction with other findings not in
conflict with its conclusion that such fees are reasonable.
While it is a fact that counsel for Appellants drafted and submitted to the trial court
the Final Order and Judgment, the trial court most assuredly reviewed such Order.
Moreover, it would appear that the trial court carefully reviewed the proposed Order.
This conclusion is based on the trial court's extensive modification of the Order. In
particular, of the 21 lines of text on page 2 of the Order, the trial court deleted more than
8 lines of text, or nearly 40% of such text. The trial court also deleted part of a line of
-11-

text on page 3 of the proposed Order, which is the same page containing the particular
paragraph on the reasonableness of attorney fees.
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the trial court signed the proposed Order
after first carefully reading the text of the entire Order. As such, the particular paragraph
containing the trial court's conclusion about the reasonableness of Appellants' attorney
fees was intentionally left intact without any modification. In effect, it is reasonable that
the trial court's ruling was intended to reflect its own analysis, findings and conclusions
in a similar manner as the trial court's deletions most assuredly reflect its analysis,
findings and conclusions.

IL Even if the trial court had weighed all of the evidence presented to it on the issue
of attorney fees, such evidence could not reasonably lead to the reduction of fees
entered by the trial court.

Appellants are aware that they must marshal all of the evidence in the record that
could possibly support the trial court's reduction of attorney fees. In doing so, Appellants
will show that such evidence could not reasonably lead to the reduction of fees entered by
the trial court. The only evidence in the record to support a reduction of fees are the two
documents filed by Appellees: (1) Appellees' objections to the amount of attorney fees,
Addendum 4; and (2) the affidavit of attorney Brent Stephens. Addendum 5. These two
documents will now be examined and analyzed in detail.
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Appellees failed to identify any particular itemized fee contained in the billing
records. Addendum 4. Instead, Appellees simply argue, in less than two pages, that such
fees were unreasonable based on the affidavit of Brent Stephens and based on their
contention that an hourly billing rate of $175 and $185 was too high for Appellants'
counsel. Id. An analysis of each argument made by Appellees will show the inadequacy
of Appellees' objections. To avoid repetition in the following analysis, all four objections
analyzed are contained in Appellees' memorandum, attached hereto as Addendum 4, and
its supporting affidavit from attorney Brent Stephens, attached hereto as Addendum 5.
First, Appellees contend that fees are too high because three of four causes of action
were uncontested. This is a disingenuous argument, particularly since Appellees
commenced this action and they included all four causes of action in their Complaint. If
three of the four causes of action were actually uncontested, Appellees should be subject
to Rule 11 sanctions and their counsel should be subject to ethical violations. In reality,
none of the causes of action were uncontested.
While it is true that Appellees filed a non-opposition memorandum to Appellants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Cause of Action, such non-opposition
came only after Appellants' motion and memorandum had been filed. Once Appellees
received Appellants' memorandum, with its supporting documents and affidavit from
attorney Richard Perkins, they realized that they could not prevail. So they simply
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folded. However, Appellants had already expended a substantial amount of work before
Appellees folded.9
The same procedure occurred for the Second and Fourth Causes of Action. After
Appellants expended a substantial effort, Appellees conceded those claims.
Appellees not only vigorously defended against Appellants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action, they also filed a Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action, including an affidavit from
Mr. Blevins which contained substantial hearsay. (R. 266-293.)
Therefore, Appellees' contention that three of the four causes of action were
uncontested has little significance and could not reasonably lead to a reduction of fees.
Such causes of action only became uncontested after it became clear from the substantial
memoranda and evidence prepared by Appellants that Appellees could not prevail. Had
Appellees not included in their Complaint the three causes of action that they later
conceded, Appellants would not have been required to defend against them nor to incur
attorney fees. Appellees' failure to properly evaluate their claims before asserting them
has now come back to haunt them; they now try to avoid paying for their own failure.

9

The First Cause of Action involved a claim for money that was allegedly unpaid
by one of the Appellants and which arose from a prior bankruptcy proceeding. Upon
investigation, it was determined that such money had in fact been paid to Appellees'
counsel well before this action was commenced. To properly support a Motion for
Summary Judgment, Appellees were required to obtain the appropriate documents and to
obtain an affidavit from the attorney involved in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Approximately 6 hours were spent on such activity.
-14-

Second, Appellees contend that "discovery" was limited to two sets of written
discovery by Appellants and one set of written discovery by Appellees. Appellees
provide no further elaboration or details. Without more, such statement, even if
considered as evidence, could not reasonably lead to any conclusion about the extent of
work involved in the case. For instance, the number of hours contained in the billing
records spent on discovery were not analyzed by Appellees nor was any effort made by
Appellees to determine if such hours were unreasonable. Also, Appellees never asserted
that the amount of discovery was unreasonable. Accordingly, Appellees' second
objection could not reasonably lead to a reduction of fees.
Third, Appellees contend that the fees sought are unreasonable in light of the amount
in controversy. Appellees also support their contention with an affidavit from a local
attorney, Brent Stephens. However, the amount in controversy set forth by Appellees in
their memorandum of objections is inconsistent with the amount sought by Appellees in
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action. (R. 273-74.)
In their motion, Appellees sought $16,620. When added to their First Cause of Action,
the total sought by Appellees was $17,820, plus unspecified damages, costs, interest, and
attorney fees as provided by the underlying Agreement. This represents a great deal more
than the $6,830 stated in their memorandum of objections. In other words, Appellees
intentionally misrepresented the amount in controversy to support their contention that
fees were too great. Nonetheless, the amount in controversy is not a determinative factor.
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Appellees contend that total fees "should not be for more than 50% of the amount
sought or defended against in a commercial case having no significant legal or
constitutional issues." Addendum 4 at 4. Appellees offer no law to support such a
contention. Rather, Appellees rely solely on the affidavit of Brent Stephens as their
authority.
Although Mr. Stephens was not qualified as an expert by the trial court,10 he states
that from his experience, " . . . reasonable fees would not exceed fifty percent of the
amount in controversy, as the facts have been explained to me in this type of case as
explained to me as previously noted." Addendum 5 at 4. First of all, Mr. Stephens'
knowledge of the case came entirely from Mr. Blevins and his counsel. Such input is
obviously one-sided as evidenced by Mr. Stephens' misunderstanding of the amount in
controversy. He was informed by Mr. Blevins and his counsel that the amount in
controversy was approximately $7,000. But this amount is completely inconsistent with
the $16,620 sought by Appellees on their Third Cause of Action. This illustrates the bias
and misinformation that was intentionally conveyed to him by Appellees.
Notwithstanding the amount in controversy, Mr. Stephens only states his experience.
He cites no law in support of any rule, formula or policy that suggests or mandates that

10

From a Lexis search, Mr. Stephens has participated in only two appeals in the
past 10 years and he failed to prevail in either of them. His experience with overturning a
trial court's ruling is weak at best. The attempt by Appellees to present Mr. Stephens as
an expert on this issue fails. Mr. Stephens was never qualified by the trial court as an
expert and Appellants never had an opportunity to cross examine him or dispute his
testimony except in their reply memorandum. (R. 471-480.)
-16-

attorney fees are to be limited to 50% of the amount in controversy. Since such a
suggestion is unsupported and even contrary to Utah law on the issue, this "evidence"
cannot reasonably lead to a reduction in fees. Further, the failure of Mr. Stephens to even
acknowledge or cite case law on the issue undermines his credibility to testify on the
appropriate amount of attorney fees.
For example, Mr. Stephens ignored the holding in Dixie State Bank:
In addition, although the amount in controversy can be a factor in
determining a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much
reliance on this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes
about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of SLOOP
as it takes to collect a note for $100.000. As stated in Cabrera:
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in this
case cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is
greater than the amount recovered on the contract. The
amount of the damages awarded in a case does not place a
necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that can be
awarded.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); American
Vending Servs. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In American Vending Services, this Court cited four factors for determining the
reasonableness of attorney fees as previously set forth in Dixie:
In Dixie State Bank, the supreme court listed four questions that the trial
court should answer in arriving at a reasonable amount for attorney fees:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter?
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3. Is the attorney's billing rate customarily charged in the locality for
similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The amount in controversy is not included among the four factors cited in Dixie and
as reaffirmed in American Vending Services. Counsel for Appellants filed his affidavit
with detailed billing records to show the work performed. Neither Appellees nor the trial
court found any item contained in those records to have been unnecessary or
unreasonable.
It is also important to note that Appellees fail to offer any reasonable alternative
available to Appellants. Should Appellants have merely defaulted and permitted
Appellees to freely prosecute their claims with little or no defense, merely on the basis
that attorney fees could be greater than the amount in controversy? Since attorney fees
are provided by the Agreement, is it not reasonable that the amount in controversy also
include the amount of attorney fees? And, since attorney fees are provided by the
Agreement, including those fees on appeal, (R. 288), is it not also reasonable that
Appellants should rely on that contractual provision to cover their attorney fees and not
merely weigh the required effort against the damages sought by Appellees?
Based on the foregoing, there is no basis in law to support Appellees' contention that
attorney fees are to be limited to 50% of the amount in controversy, regardless of whether
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the amount is $7,000 or $17,000. Moreover, the affidavit of Mr. Stephens should not be
given much if any weight since he is not an expert and his opinion is contrary to
established law.
Fourth, Appellees contend that the hourly rate of Michael Jensen, counsel for
Appellants, is too high, given his experience. However, Appellees offer no evidence that
such hourly rate is unreasonable. Appellees also suggest that Mr. Jensen's hourly rate
ought to be less than customary because of the kind of office used by him. However,
Appellees have no basis or evidence for making such a statement and it is patently false.
They do not know the number of offices from which Mr. Jensen practices law.11
Furthermore, it makes no difference on how efficient or inefficient an attorney is in
the operation of his law office. The issue is not how much or how little expenses are.
Rather, it is whether the rate charged is reasonable and customary in the community
where the attorney practices. Appellees offer no comparisons to rates charged by other
attorneys.12

11

In reality, Mr. Jensen practices out of two offices, one in downtown Salt Lake
City and a home office in Murray. In effect, Mr. Jensen maintains telephone lines,
computers, fax machines, copiers and filing systems in both locations. Under Appellees'
theory, having two offices should justify charging a higher hourly rate than is customary.
12

During the many years of litigation with Appellees, Mr. Jensen learned from the
hourly rate charged by Appellees' counsel. Through affidavits submitted by counsel for
Appellees, it was learned that he charged $175 an hour. Therefore, it appears that counsel
for Appellees is comparing his experience and competency with that of Mr. Jensen.
-19-

More importantly, the trial court previously approved Mr. Jensen's hourly rate.
(R. 173-75.) The trial court approved his attorney fees when Custom Steel, et al were
dismissed and the trial court awarded attorney fees to them. Id. If the hourly rate was
reasonable during that phase of the case, it surely is reasonable for the remainder of the
case.
Finally, Appellees contend that an attorney's hourly rate should be a formula tied to
the number of years in practice as an attorney. However, no rule or case law supports
such a contention and Appellees have failed to cite any such rule or law. An attorney's
hourly rate is a function of many variables, only one of which is the number of years in
practice as an attorney. Other factors such as education, work experience, maturity and
judgment are important in establishing a reasonable hourly rate. Competence and
intellect of an attorney are additional factors.
In this case, the proof is in the pudding. Counsel for Appellees allowed his clients to
bring this case when a more competent attorney would or should have known that
Appellees' claims were without merit. Appellees contend that three out of four causes of
action were not contested. But Appellees did not lose their case based on newly
discovered evidence. Rather, Appellees lost because they had no legally cognizable
claims. All claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Do these facts suggest that
counsel for Appellants is less competent than counsel for Appellees? Obviously not.
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Based on all the evidence before the trial court, such evidence and arguments could
not reasonably lead to a reduction of fees, particularly where there are no findings made
by the trial court to support such a reduction.
ISSUE NO. 2:
Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants' motion for
additional attorney fees and costs incurred in collecting the original
judgment against Appellees, particularly when Appellees filed no
objections to such motion.

III. The trial court erred when it denied Appellants' attorney fees incurred during
the collection process.
On April 12, 2002, Appellants filed a Motion to Augment Judgment to recover
attorney fees and costs incurred while collecting and attempting to collect on the
Judgment. (R. 528-29), attached hereto as Addendum 6. Appellees vigorously defended
against all collection efforts. When Appellants were finally able to serve Mr. Blevins
with an Order in Supplemental Proceedings, Appellees filed on April 1, 2002, a Motion to
Quash Supplemental Order. (R. 506-511) And on April 3, 2002, Appellees also served
Appellants with post-judgment discovery requests.13 (R. 512) Finally, on April 11, 2002,
Appellees deposited with the Clerk of the trial court a personal check in the amount of the

After Appellants filed a Motion for Protective Order, Appellees withdrew their
discovery requests. (R. 551-52)
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Judgment and simultaneously filed a Notice of Supersedeas Bond. Appellees also
obtained a hearing on the same day, April 11, 2002, at which the trial court denied the
bond and permitted Appellants to obtain Appellees' deposit. (R. 537-39.)
In response to Appellees' aggressive defenses during the collection phase, Appellants
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Supplemental Order (R. 500-04.)
and a Motion for Protective Order. (R. 517-18.) Appellants, through counsel, also
appeared at two hearings: (1) for the Supplemental Proceeding, at which Mr. Blevins
failed to appear (R. 575-76); and (2) for the Notice of Supersedeas Bond, at which the
trial court ruled against Appellees and approved and entered the Order Forfeiting Bond
(R. 537-39).
Appellants filed with their Motion to Augment an affidavit of fees and costs "relating
to the collection of Judgment," including detailed billing records attached to the affidavit
(R. 530-36), attached hereto as Addendum 7. Counsel for Appellants spent 11 hours in
the collection of the Judgment, including time at the hearing held on April 11, 2003, and
$72 in advanced costs for a writ of garnishment, to serve Appellees' bank with the writ,
and for service of process to serve the Order in Supplemental Proceedings. The Motion
to Augment sought a total of $2,107 in fees and costs. Concurrently with the Motion,
Appellants submitted a proposed order and judgment, but the proposed order was filed
unsigned with a handwritten note stating "denied." (R. 581-82)
Since there is no appeal from an unsigned order, counsel for Appellants twice wrote
letters to the trial court requesting that it enter a signed order denying the Motion to
-22-

Augment Judgment. (R. 626-27) Finally, on September 22, 2002, the trial court entered
its order denying Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment. (R. 628-69), attached hereto
as Addendum 8.
The Denial Order, Addendum 8, contains one relevant paragraph, besides the denial
of fees and costs:
"The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motion to Augment
Judgment and its supporting Affidavit of Attorney Fees, and finding no
opposition to the motion, denies the Motion finding that fees are
unreasonable''
Denial of First Order and Judgment, (R. 628), Addendum 8 {emphasis added).

The trial court deleted the word "no" before the word "opposition" and added the text
that is in italics and underscored: '[finding that fees are unreasonable." As in Issue No. 1,
the trial court made no findings of fact to support its ruling.
Although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award "must be based on the evidence and supported
by findings of fact." See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207 f9.; Salmon v. Davis
County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). Here, the trial court again failed to support its
denial of fees and costs. Simply stating that "fees are unreasonable" is not sufficient to
support such a conclusion, especially when detailed billing records were available to the
trial court. This Court should, therefore, review the sufficiency of the trial court's
findings under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms,
1999 UT App 207 ^|9. Under such standard, this Court should find that the trial court's
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denial of fees and costs was in error, since the trial court totally failed to support its denial
with any findings of fact. See id; Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893
(Utah 1996).

IV. Even if the trial court had weighed all of the evidence presented to it on the issue
of post-judgment attorney fees and costs to collect on the Judgment such
evidence could not reasonably lead to the reduction of fees entered by the trial
court

As with Issue No. 1, Appellants are aware that they must marshal all of the evidence
in the record that could possibly support the trial court's denial of attorney fees and costs.
In doing so, Appellants will show that such evidence could not reasonably lead to the
Denial Order entered by the trial court. The only evidence in the record to support the
denial of fees and costs is one document filed by Appellees: Appellees' objections, which
were belatedly filed. (R. 564-65), attached hereto in Exhibit A of Addendum 9.
It is important to note the procedural steps leading to the trial court's Denial Order.
First, Appellants filed on April 12, 2002, their Motion to Augment Judgment.
Addendum 7. On April 30, 2002, 18 days later, Appellants filed their Notice to Submit
for Decision. On May 3, 2002, Appellees filed an Objection to Form of Order and Notice
to Submit Re: Motion to Augment Judgment. (R. 562-65), attached hereto as
Addendum 9.
Appellees Objections assert that they had filed a memorandum in opposition and
attached such memorandum as Exhibit A. Addendum 9. However, the record does not
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support Appellees' contention. There is no record of any memorandum in opposition to
Appellees' Motion to Augment Judgment being filed until they did so on May 3, 2002,
when they filed a single paragraph as an Exhibit A. Addendum 9.
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellees failed to file a timely memorandum in
opposition to Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment, the content of their belated
memorandum and opposition is comprised of a single paragraph as follows:
"Given Defendants Counsel's length of experience in the practice of
law, the fact that he offices in his home and has next to no overhead, the
lack of difficulty of the post-judgment issues herein, the rates charged
and the amount of time allegedly incurred are excessive. "
Addendum 9.

Appellees again fail to cite to any particular task itemized in the billing records filed
by Appellants. And again Appellees make the same arguments made in opposition to the
attorney fees sought following the entry of the Judgment. Appellants incorporate herein
by reference the arguments made in Part II above.
The record is clear that Appellees avoided collection. Not only did Mr. Blevins not
appear at the Supplemental Proceeding, Appellees took the extraordinary step of filing a
Motion to Quash the Order in Supplemental Proceeding. Appellees also engaged in
dilatory and unjustifiable activities when they served post-judgment discovery requests on
Appellants. (R. 512) Although they subsequently withdrew their discovery requests, it
was only after Appellants filed their Motion for Protective Order. (R. 517-18, 551-52)
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Based on the aggressive defense and conduct of Appellees, the time (11 hours) spent
by Appellants' counsel is reasonable in performing the following: obtain and serve an
Order in Supplemental Proceeding; obtain and serve a Writ of Garnishment; prepare and
file a Motion for Protective Order; attend two hearings; and prepare the appropriate Order
Forfeiting Bond and collecting thereon. In addition, $72 in costs were incurred.
The trial court's conclusion that such fees are unreasonable is not supported by the
evidence in the record. In effect, the trial court's ruling provides for no fees or costs for
collection activities. That is contrary to the provision of the Agreement that provides for
fees and costs, it is also contrary to Utah law.
In Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the issue of "fees for fees."
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether fees
incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also be
awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale articulated
in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 293,
994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993):
Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that the
unavailability of ,ffees for fees" could render fee-shifting
provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the
underlying statutes. . . . An award of "fees for fees" is not
merely a remote descendant of the underlying action from
which it derives. Rather, it is an integral aspect of the
statutory scheme on which the underlying claim is based.
994 F.2d at 22;. . .
Analogously,... attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should
also include fees incurred on appeal. In Management Services v.
Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980), we stated
that the purpose of an attorney fees provision is to indemnify the
-26-

prevailing party against the necessity of paying attorney fees and
thereby enable him to recover the full amount of the obligation. Id. at
409. . .. Similarly,... the prevailing party in a dispute over a
contractual attorney fees provision was entitled, not only to attorney fees
on appeal, but also to the fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness
of the fees for which it was entitled to be indemnified. James
Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

If the fee-shifting provision of the Agreement is to have its intended meaning, then
Appellants are entitled to their fees during the collection process as well as on appeal.
The trial court's denial of any attorney fees and costs incurred in the collection process is
plain error and this Court should remand or instruct the trial court to enter an augmented
judgment in the amount of $2,107 as requested and supported by affidavit.
The foregoing cases and the Agreement provide ample justification for this Court to
award Appellants their fees and costs incurred on appeal.

CONCLUSION
On both Issue No. 1 and 2, the trial court failed to support with findings of fact its
reduction and denial of attorney fees. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court
was in error when it reduced the amount of attorney fees sought by Appellants in the
primary phase of the litigation and when it denied attorney fees and costs in the postjudgment, collection phase. In addition, an examination and analysis of all evidence in
the record yields no support for any reduction in the amount or denial of attorney fees.
Further, based on the trial court's Final Order and Judgment that Appellants' attorney fees

Custom\Blevins3\Appeal\Brief September 22, 2003
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are reasonable, this Court should direct the trial court to enter an augmented judgment in
the amount of $5,488 ($11,538 minus $6,050 awarded), plus accrued interest from
Febraary 1, 2002, the date of entry of the original judgment. And, this Court should also
direct the trial court to enter an additional judgment in the amount of $2,107 for the fees
and costs incurred while collecting the initial Judgment. Finally, this Court should also
award Appellants their attorney fees and costs on appeal.

DATED this 22nd day of September 2003.

Michael A. Jensen (
Counsel for Appellaiits
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DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
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10758 South 1090 East
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DATED this 22nd day of September 2003.

Michael A. Jensen /
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

WAGED
FEB - | 2002
By.

Counsel for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN R1CIGTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motions and Memoranda for Summary
Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action and also having reviewed
Plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition, and after hearing on November 30, 2001, at which
all parties were represented by counsel and where Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to
dismissing Plaintiffs' Second and Fourth Causes of Action, now makes the following
conclusions:

JD

1. After applying the test as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass yn,
907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), the Court finds that Paragraph 3.2.b. of the Settlement
Agreement, which forms the subject matter for Plaintiffs' Third Cause Action, is
unambiguous.
2. The Settlement Agreement provides that Mr. Blevins use his best business
judgment in negotiating and settling the Clean Gas Receivable claimuand that Mr. Blevins
admittedly did or should have used his best business judgment in accepting the amount
from Clean Ga3 on the Clean Gas Receivable claim. As a consoquoncoffhere was and is
no offset as contemplated within the Settlement Agreement to support Plaintiffs5 claim.
Further, there was and is no breach of Defendants' duty to act with good faith and fair
dealing.
3. Consistent with the Court's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action should be
granted.
4. Since the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorney fees to the
prevailing party, Defendants are determined to be the prevailing party and are therefore
entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
Sinus Mi. Blevins used his best business judgment when he accepted the amount
paid by Clean Ga3, the Court finds that there is no need to consider whether Mr. Blevins'
affidavit testimony is hearsay. Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Defendants'

The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on
the First Cause of Action and now by granting summary judgment on all remaining
causes of action, and after reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by
Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action be granted and
that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed,in ito entirety with projudico and on ito morifa.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants be awarded their reasonable
attorney fees in the amount of $

AGREED AS TO FORM:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Custom\Order3 Final Order Judgment December 7, 2001
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
730 Three Fountains #87
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

Filed & Served 12/26/2001

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN)

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the same as I have stated herein.
2.

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services

for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action.
4.

I have personally spent more than 76.4 hours representing Defendants in this

action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it
increased to $185 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of $177
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 64.9 hours. At
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $11,538.
5.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to

those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation
activities.
6.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Plaintiffs' Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "nonopposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed.
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A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action,
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal
of their Second Cause of Action.
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, I filed a third motion for
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.
7.

This Amended Affidavit is for the sole purpose of adding 6.4 hours for research

and drafting a Response to Plaintiffs' Objections and to update and prepare this affidavit.
DATED this 26th day of December 2001.

Michael A. Jensen
On the 26th day of December 2001, personally appeared before me,
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the
best of his information and belief.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Q
Custom\Blevins3\Jensen AfO Fees December 26, 2001
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Notary Public
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' /£$>**?rS$£< lYNQAA H0L3BQ0K
136 Souin Main, Ste. 318
SaHLake City, Utah 84101
My Commission Expires
June 15,2003
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CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants.
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally mailing a copy to:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315

DATED this 26th day of December 2001.

MICHAEL A. JE
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
730 Three Fountains #87
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
Counsel for Defendants

Filed & Served 12/07/2001

FILED UiSTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 7 - 2 0 0 1
bALc,

14AKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES (MICHAEL A. JENSEN)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the same as I have stated herein.
2.

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services

for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action.
4.

I have personally spent more than 70 hours representing Defendants in this

action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it
increased to $185 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of $177
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 58.5 hours. At
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $10,354.
5.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to

those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation
activities.
6.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Plaintiffs' Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "nonopposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed.
2

A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action,
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal
of their Second Cause of Action.
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, I filed a third motion for
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.
7.

I have attached hereto my billing records in this matter.

DATED this 3rd day of December 2001.

Michael A. Jensen

f J

On the 3rd day of December 2001, personally appeared before me,
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the
best of his information and belief.
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CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,

Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally delivering a copy to:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315

DATED this 7th day of December 2001.

MICHAEL A. JENI
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Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

Selection Criteria
Slip.Classification
Open
Client (hand select) Include: Custom3 Blevins
Slip.Transaction Ty 1-1

Rate Info - identifies rate source and level

User
Slip ID
Dates and Time
Activity
Posting Status
Client
Description
Reference
Jensen
9127
TIME
Litigation
10/06/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: read and review Complaint withl
Clients.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status
175.00 ~
T@1

87.50

Jensen
9128
TIME
Litigation
10/13/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

Jensen
9129
TIME
Litigation
10/18/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client re representation.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

35.00

Jensen
9140
TIME
Litigation
10/19/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Motion to Dismiss, Motion
to Strike portions of Complaint, and
Motion for a More Definite Statement.

3.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

595.00

Jensen
9155
TIME
Litigation
10/30/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client (Randy)

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

Jensen
9282
TIME
Litigation
11/16/00
Billed
G:12193
11/30/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Richard Perkins re trust funds held by him
and turned over to Trustee for Linda
Isaacson's bankruptcy.

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

87.50

Slip Value

1

12/02/01
2 13 PM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
9289
TIME
11/18/00
Billed
G12193
11/30/00
Litigation review dates of memoranda
filed on motion to dismiss, draft, file, and
mail Notice to Submit for Decision on
Motion to Dismiss

Michael A Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

Page

Units
DNBTime
Est Time
Variance
0 20
0 00
0 00
0 00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

175 00 ~
T@1

35 00

9297
TIME
Jensen
11/20/00
Litigation
Billed
G12193
11/30/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation file, draft, and mail Notice to
Submit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss
and to Strike

0
0
0
0

20
00
00
00

175 00
T@1

35 00

9607
TIME
Jensen
01/15/01
Litigation
Billed
G12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation telephone conversation with
Richard Perkins re affidavit and when he
will respond

010
0 00
0 00
0 00

175 00
T@1

17 50

9608
TIME
Jensen
01/29/01
Litigation
Billed
G12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation read and review revisions
requested by Perkins for his affidavit, edit
and revise affidavit, draft letter and fax to
Perkins with revision and redlined version
and requesting signing to be this week

0
0
0
0

80
00
00
00

175 00
T@1

140 00

Jensen
9611
TIME
Litigation
01/30/01
Billed
G12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation meet with Richard Perkins at
his office to discuss affidavit and have him
sign it and obtain good copies of exhibits
to attach to affidavit

0
0
0
0

50
00
00
00

175 00
T@1

87 50

Jensen
9646
TIME
Litigation
02/06/01
Billed
G 12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation draft, file, and serve Notice to
Submit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss,
draft, file, and serve Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on First Cause of
Action, draft, file, and serve Memorandum
in Support of Motion for same, finalize
and incorporate Affidavit of Richard

3
0
0
0

80
00
00
00

175 00
T@1

665 00

2

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
Perkins with Memorandum for SJ.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
_ Reference

Page

Units
Rate
DNBTime
Rate Info
Est. Time
Bill Status
Variance _

Slip Value

Jensen
9955
TIME
04/09/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Judge Dever's law clerk, Ray, re status of
decision on two Notices to Submit for
Decision.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

9957
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
04/10/01
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review Minute Entry of Judge
Dever; draft proposed Order and
Judgment based on Minute Entry; draft
Motion and Memorandum for Attorney
Fees; review billing records and draft
Affidavit in support of attorney fees.

1.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

262.50

Jensen
9975
TIME
04/11/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Guardianship and/or Conservatorship
Activities: arrange for deliver of
documents to Mr. Dunn; file documents at
Court.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

35.00

9979
TIME
Jensen
04/11/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Answer to Complaint; draft
First Discovery interrogatories, requests,
and admissions; draft Motion for
Scheduling Conference.

3.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

630.00

10034
TIME
Jensen
04/20/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: receive and read Objection to
Form of Order; research issues of "with
prejudice" and "on the merits;" draft
Alternative Order; draft, file, and mail
Defendants' Objection to Objection; draft
Amended Motion for Attorney Fees; draft
and have notarized Amended Affidavit (for
attorney fees).

1.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

280.00

3

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
10098
TIME
04/30/01
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01
Litigation: read and review motions and
memoranda from Dunn.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

10138
TIME
Jensen
05/05/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft response to Second
Objection to form of Order and request for
attorney fees; draft Second Amended
Motion for Attorney Fees; draft Second
Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees.

1.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

245.00

Jensen
10139
TIME
Litigation
05/05/01
Billed
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Memorandum in
Opposition to Rule 59 Motion.

2.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

385.00

10140
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
05/07/01
Billed
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft and file at Court Notice to
Submit on Form of Order, Memorandum
in Opposition, Reponse to Second
Objection, 2nd Amended Motion for
Attorney Fees, and 2nd Amended
Affidavit of Attorney Fees; deliver copies
to Dunn.

0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

70.00

10229
TIME
Jensen
05/21/01
Litigation
Billed
G.12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft and file Reply to
Response to Second Amended Motion for
Attorney Fees.

0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

157.50

10231
TIME
Jensen
05/22/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review deposition of Steve
Blevins; review responses to Requests for
Admissions; draft, file and serve Motion
and Memorandum in Support of Partial
Summary Judgment on Second Cause of
Action; read and review first discovery
requests from Dunn.

4.80
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

840.00

175.00 ~
T@1

4

Slip Value

35.00

MHS-

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Slip ID
Activity
Dates and Time
Client
Posting Status
Description
_ Reference
Jensen
10271
TIME
Litigation
05/30/01
Billed
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft, file, and serve Reply
Memorandum; draft, file, and serve Notice
to Submit for Decision.

Units
DNBTime
Est. Time
Variance
0.70
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

175.00
T@1

122.50

10359
TIME
Jensen
06/19/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client re Discovery Requests from
Blevins; review faxed responses from
Client.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

35.00

Jensen
10358
TIME
06/20/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: Telephone conference with
Judge Dever and Dunn re schedule to
complete discovery and file dispositive
motions.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

10365
TIME
Jensen
06/21/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review responses to Discovery
from Clients; telephone conversation with
Clients re same; draft formal Answers and
Responses and priority mail to Clients for
review and signature.

2.80
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

490.00

10385
TIME
Jensen
06/25/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: receive completed signature
page faxed from Clients; edit and revise
Discovery Responses and mail and file
same.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

52.50

10455
TIME
Jensen
07/12/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12571
07/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review discovery responses
from Dunn; draft and serve Second
Discovery Requests.

1.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

227.50

5

MH^

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

10650
TIME
Jensen
08/23/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: begin drafting Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.

6.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

1102.50

10651
TIME
08/24/01
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01
Litigation: draft and mail affidavits to
Clients; research issues of hearsay in
affidavits and accord and satisfaction as
relates to interest; draft Motion and
Memorandum to Strike Hearsay
Testimony.

Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

4.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

770.00

10652
TIME
Jensen
08/27/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Motion and Memorandum
in Support of Summary Judgment on 3rd
and 4th Causes of Action; telephone
conversation with Client re affidavits and
status of case in general.

7.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

1277.50

10667
TIME
Jensen
08/29/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client re case and re affidavit; file Motion
and Memorandum for Summary
Judgment; serve Dunn and Client with
copies.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

52.50

10668
TIME
Jensen
08/30/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment; file and serve same; mail copy
to Client.

2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

420.00

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
10649
TIME
08/17/01
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01
Litigation: receive and read responses to
second discovery requests.

175.00 ~
T@1

6

Slip Value

17.50

it

M^rO

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Slip ID
Activity
Dates and Time
Client
Posting Status
Description
Reference
Jensen
10716
TIME
Litigation
09/05/01
Billed
G:12666
09/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: receive and review Notice to
Submit on Summary Judgment; telephone
conversation with Court; review Court's
Docket; draft and fax letter to Dunn; draft
Motion to Strike Notice to Submit.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.70
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

10775
TIME
Jensen
09/19/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12666
09/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review Dunn's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on 3rd and 4th Causes of
Action; draft Reply Memorandum on
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for
Decision; review Dunn's Memo in
Opposition to Motion to Strike Hearsay
Testimony of Steven Blevins; research
Rules of Evidence on Hearsay and
exceptions; draft Reply Memorandum on
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for
Decision on Motion; draft Request for
Hearing on October 30th, date set for
Motion for SJ on 2nd Cause of Action.

5.90
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

1091.50

10847
TIME
Jensen
10/05/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12707
10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: meet with Judge Dever's Clerk
re pending motions and need to
consolidate hearing on all such motions.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

37.00

Jensen
10887
TIME
G&C
10/10/01
Billed
G:12707
10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Guardianship and/or Conservatorship
Activities: meet with Judge Dever's Clerk
re Request to Hear all Motions and
confirm with her that all motions will be
heard on October 30th, subject to any
delay caused by extensive jury trial
currently underway.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

18.50

10908
TIME
Jensen
10/16/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12707
10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft, file and mail Notice of

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

37.00

185.00 ~
T@1

7

Slip Value

129.50

Msl

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
Hearing for October 30, 2001.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
_ Reference

Page

Units
Rate
DNB Time
Rate Info
Est. Time
Bill Status
Variance __

8

Slip Value

11110
TIME
Jensen
11/13/01
Litigation
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: meet with Judge Dover's clerk
re schedule for hearing; draft, file and
serve Withdrawal of Motion for
Continuance.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

55.50

11154
TIME
Jensen
11/19/01
Litigation
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review case file and court's
docket; draft and file Amended
Withdrawal of Motion for Continuance;
review Reply Affidavit of Blevins; draft and
file Amended Motion to Strike to include
Reply Affidavit of Blevins.

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

92.50

11184
TIME
Jensen
11/26/01
Litigation
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: organize and select documents
to include as courtesy copies in a binder
for Friday's hearing on motions for
summary judgment.

1.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

222.00

11216
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
11/30/01
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: prepare for and attending
hearing on Motions for Summary
Judgment; begin draft of Final Order and
Judgment.

2.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

388.50

11218
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
12/03/01
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: obtain copy of Court's docket
and review entries; select from TimeSlips
all entries for this case, excluding all costs
and expenses; draft Affidavit of Attorney's
Fees; edit and revise Final Order and
Judgment.

1.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

259.00

Grand Total

MT\

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Billable
Unbillable
Total

^ 55

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
66.10
0.00
66.10

Page

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Jr^L

9

Slip Value

11693.50
0.00
11693.50

^ ^
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Tab 4

pf

RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C.
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 521-3800
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
1 STEVEN C. BLEVINS and DEBRA KAY
BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.,
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC.,
et al,
Defendants.

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER
AND OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND DEMAND FOR
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Case No. 000906072-CN
Honorable Judge Dever
District Judge

The Plaintiffs, Steven C. Blevins and Debra Kay Blevins (the "Blevins"), by and
through their attorney and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, UCJA, hereby submit
their objection to the proposed Final Order and Judgment and accompanying Attorney's Fees
Affidavit. Moreover, the Plaintiffs demand an evidentiary hearing on the attorney's fees
claims of counsel for Defendants.
FACTS
1. The Plaintiffs commenced this proceeding alleging various breaches of a Global
Settlement Agreement by all Defendants (the "Isaacson"). Those breaches included:
a.

Failing to direct funds held by counsel to be paid to a bankruptcy trustee;

b.

Failing to redeem certain personalty in a timely fashion; and

c.

Failing to indemnify against offsets claimed by the Plaintiffs' payor, and
otherwise failing to perform the duties of good faith and fair dealing.

2. Three of the Isaacsons had previously commenced a proceeding against the
Plaintiffs, seeking under $11 in interest and nearly $7,000 in attorney's fees incurred in a third
party proceeding, defending a prejudgment garnishment of $6,667 payable by a third party.
3. A deadline was set in that earlier proceeding for amending pleadings and bringing in
other parties: the Plaintiffs missed that deadline, and thus filed the instant proceeding.
4. The Plaintiffs moved Judge Peuler in the earlier proceeding to consolidate this
proceeding with the earlier one, but she refused.
5. Thereupon, the three of the Isaacsons that were plaintiffs in the earlier proceeding
moved successfully to have the claims against them herein dismissed, and the Court awarded
$1,330 in attorney's fees to them.
6. Upon the Isaacsons' demonstrating that the funds payable to the bankruptcy trustee
were paid before the effective date of the Global Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiffs informed
the Isaacsons' counsel that they would stipulate to dismissal of the cause of action related to
that alleged breach.
7. Upon receipt of a ruling by Judge Peuler in the prior proceeding that claims based
upon the untimely redemption of certain personalty were unripe, the Plaintiffs informed the
Isaacsons' counsel that they would stipulate to dismissal of the cause of action related to that
alleged breach, without prejudice.

2

ARGUMENT
A. The Proposed Order of Judgment,
The Plaintiffs object to the dismissal "with prejudice and on the merits" of their Second
Cause of Action, regarding alleged breaches of a duty to redeem certain personalty in a timely
fashion and, thus, obviate or at least limit storage costs being incurred for which the Plaintiffs
might be responsible. Judge Peuler ruled in the earlier proceeding that claims by the three
dismissed defendants herein based upon the same personalty were unripe, as the storage
company had not made any claim upon any party for unpaid storage charges.
Based upon that ruling of unripeness, the Plaintiffs consented to dismissal of the second
cause of action. The dismissal should not be "with prejudice and on the merits," as the statute
of limitations on the claim for alleged unpaid storage charges has not yet run.
B. The Isaacsons' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Excessive.
1. The Total Amount of Fees Charged for Defending this Proceeding is Too High.
This is for several reasons, set forth in the accompanying affidavit.
a. Three of the Four Causes of Action Were Uncontested. As set forth in the facts,
above, dismissal of two of the four causes of action were not contested, either before or after
die filing of separate motions for partial summary judgment. The fourth cause of action,
against John Does unidentified by the deadline for doing so, was also the subject of an
unnecessary motion for partial summary judgment. Thus only the third claim was actually
litigated.

3

b. There Was Limited Discovery. Discovery consisted only of three sets of written
discovery requests: two by the Isaacsons and one by the Plaintiffs.
c. The Amount in Controversy Makes the Total Fees Sought Unreasonable, The
Isaacsons presently seek $10,354 in fees. The dismissed defendants were awarded $1,330,
making a total of $11,684 in fees sought on a matter in which the only cause of action that was
contested was for about $6,000 plus interest [per complaint] and $6,830 [$10,245 x 2/3 per
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment] plus interest.
The accompanying affidavit states the total fee should not be for more than about 50%
of the amount sought or defended against in a commercial case having no significant legal or
constitutional issues.
2. Rates are Too High. The Isaacsons' counsel was admitted to the bar in about
October 1995, yet his rates, $175 and $185 per hour in this proceeding, are the rates charged
that would be chargeable by an attorney having a much longer acquaintanceship with the
practice of law. Moreover, throughout this proceeding the Isaacsons' counsel has been
practicing out of a home office, which makes his overhead costs smaller, and thus a smaller
hourly fee is appropriate.

4
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RONALD L. DUNN (#A4312)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
36 South Main Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN BLEVINS and DEBRA KAY
BLEVINS,
AFFIDAVIT OF R. BRENT STEPHENS
Plaintiffs,
Case No 000906072-CN

vs.

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC.
a Utah corporation, CONTRACTING
FABRICATION MACHINING, INC.,
a dissolved Utah corporation, RANDY
ISAACSON, LINDA I. ISAACSON,
HEIDI BISHOP, JASON BISHOP,
WENDY GARAMENDI, and MARK
GARAMENDI, and JOHN DOES I-X,

Judge L. A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

R BRENT STEPHENS, after being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am an attorney and have been a member of the Utah State Bar since 1973

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and am competent to attest

thereto.
3.

I have practiced continuously with the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau

since 1973, in the area of litigation and, in particular, complex commercial litigation, commercial
litigation, contracts, antitrust, securities, and other commercial litigation matters.
4.

I have litigated attorneys' fees provisions relating to what are reasonable attorneys'

fees, and have knowledge of reasonable attorneys' fees in the context of what is a reasonable
attorney's fee in connection with a contractual provision providing attorney's fees to a prevailing
party in a contract action.
5.

A reasonable attorney's fee governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, as it

relates to this context and, in my opinion, requires the following factors to be considered:
a.

The time and labor required;

b.

The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly;

c.

The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

d.

The amount involved and the results obtained;

e.

The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and

f.

Other relevant factors that may be related to what determines a reasonable fee
under the context of the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court in this locality.

-2-
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6.

The attorneys' fees reasonably awarded should relate to specifically, in this

context, most notably the time and labor required, the amount involved, and the results obtained.
7.

I have spent approximately one hour reviewing the case with counsel for

Mr. Blevins, in reviewing the circumstances of what may constitute a reasonable fee in the context
of this litigation.
8.

I have also spent approximately an hour discussing the matter with Mr. Blevins.

9.

I am informed that the amount in controversy relating to the fee imposed

approximated $7,000.00. It is my further understanding that the amount of the fees requested
pursuant to the contractual provision for the amount in controversy is in the amount of
$10,354.00.
10.

Based upon my review of the facts of the case as previously indicated, discussions

with counsel, discussions with counsel's client, and a review of the controversy, it is my opinion
that a requested fee of $10,354.00 is excessive pursuant to the factors required to be considered
as to what constitutes a reasonable fee under the Rules of Professional Conduct as to the amount
involved, the results obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer performing the
services, and other factors relating to what constitutes a reasonable fee.
11.

Under the facts of this case as I understand them, based upon my review of the file

and my discussions with counsel and his client, the attorney's fees requested should certainly not
exceed the amount in controversy, and in my opinion, should be some percentage less than the
amount in controversy absent other and exigent circumstances (such as constitutional rights), but
certainly not in the context of a controversy involving trade or commerce, and suits under
commercial contracts.

3
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12.

It has been my experience that reasonable fees would not exceed fifty percent of

the amount in controversy, as the facts have been explained to me in this type of case as explained
to me as previously noted.
Further affiant saith not.
DATED this tf~ day of December, 2001.

R. Brent Stephens
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / / ^ d a y of December, 2001.

NOTARY
Residing i
My Commission Expires:

BLIC
Lake County,

l/fit*'

NOTARY PUBLIC

Margo D. Colegrove
10 Exchange PK • PO Box 45000
Salt Lake City. UT 84145-5000
My Commission Expires
February 17, 2003

STATE OF UTAH

-4-
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

Filed & Served 04/12/2002

m

Y C! E'X.i

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

MOTION TO AUGMENT
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY ISAACSON, LINDA
ISAACSON, WENDY GARAMENDI,
AND JASON BISHOP,
Defendants.

HEARING REQUESTED
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

Defendants Creditors, by and through counsel, hereby request the Court to augment
the Judgment entered in this case on February 1, 2002. Based on the same contract
provisions which permitted the Court to award fees and costs to Defendants, Defendants
are now entitled to augment the original Judgment of $6,050 by the fees and costs
incurred so far in attempting to collect such Judgment. Supported by the attached
affidavit, additional fees and costs amount to $2,107. Defendants, therefore, request the
Court to enter a second judgment against Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,107.

Defendants believe that Plaintiffs may become more cooperative if the Court enters
the requested judgment; Plaintiffs are particularly stubborn and vexatious.
DATED this 12th day of April 2002.

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever
STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
RANDY ISAACSON, ET AL, Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the
foregoing MOTION TO AUGMENT JUDGMENT by delivering a copy to:
Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315
DATED this 12th day of April 2002.

Custom\Blevins3\Motion8 Augment Judgment April 12,2002
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
730 Three Fountains #87
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

po r c j j o

Filed & Served 04/12/2002
«" p . '

•-L7L.'..vSDFPAr.HLM~

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk. 238-7480; In-Court Clerk. 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
RELATING TO THE COLLECTION
OF JUDGMENT

vs.

RANDY ISAACSON, LINDA
ISAACSON, WENDY GARAMENDI,
AND JASON BISHOP,
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the same as I have stated herein.

2.

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services

for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action,
including all efforts to collect on a judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiffs.
4.

I have personally spent more than 10.0 hours in attempting to collect the

Judgment amount of $6,050. In addition, costs were incurred in the amount of $72. The
amount of time includes the preparation of this affidavit and the accompanying Motion to
Augment Judgment. In addition, I expect to spend at least one additional hour at the
hearing set on Plaintiffs' motion on Friday, April 12, 2002. Combined, my total hours in
collection and related matters are 11.0 hours. At my standard billing rate of $ 185 per
hour, total fees so far in the collection process are $2,035. Adding to that the above costs
(service of process and garnishment fees) of $72, the total amount is $2,107.
5.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to

those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation
activities.
6.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The judgment debtors have vigorously and unreasonably avoided payment and thwarted
were possible all attempts to collect on the Judgment. Defendant Steven Blevins failed to
appear at a Supplemental Proceeding and the Court entered a Bench Warrant, pending the
outcome of the hearing referenced above. Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion to Quash all
-2-

supplemental proceedings and have even served discovery requests on Defendants. I
have had to respond to each of these items. The judgment debtors are solely responsible
for all of these additional legal fees and costs.
7.

This First Affidavit ofAttorney's Fees and Costs Relating to the Collection of

Judgment is for the sole purpose of awarding to Defendants the additional fees and costs
incurred by Plaintiffs1 intransigence.

DATED this 12th day of April 2002.

Michael A. Jensen ( 7
On the 12th day of April 2002, personally appeared before me, Michael A. Jensen,
the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he did execute the same
and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the best of his information
and belief.

Custom\Blevins3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees Apnl 12, 2002
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CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants.
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS RELATING TO THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENT by personally
delivering a copy to:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315

DATED this 12th day of April 2002.

MICHAEL A. JE

Custom\Blevms3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees April 12,2002
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Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

Selection Criteria
Activity (hand selec Include: Collections; Collections
Slip.Classification
Open
Client (hand select) Include: Custom3 Blevins

Rate Info - identifies rate source and level

User
Slip ID
Activity
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Client
Description
Reference
Jensen
11468
TIME
02/05/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: obtain Court's Final
Order and Judgment; draft and file
Judgment Information; draft Supple mential
Order and obtain from Court.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Jensen
Collections
Custom3 Blevins

1

42.00

42.00

Jensen
11606
TIME
Collections
03/18/02
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Collection Activities: review fax letter and
telephone message from Dunn requesting
continuance of Supp Proceeding; draft
and fax letter to Dunn re same; telephone
call from Dunn confirming date reset to
3/28/2002.

0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

74.00

11618
TIME
Jensen
03/19/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: telephone call from
Dunn re second change to Supplemental
Proceeding.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

18.50

11664
TIME
Jensen
03/28/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review faxed motion from Dunn
to quash supplemental order; draft
Memorandum in Opposition.

2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

444.00

11598
EXP
03/04/02
WIP
Collection Expenses: Process Server to
Serve Steven Blevins with a
Supplemental Order.

185.00 ~
T@1

Slip Value

203.50

1

04/11/02
2:10 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

Slip ID
User
Dates and Time
Activity
Posting Status
Client
Description
_ Reference
11665
TIME
Jensen
03/29/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum;
file Memorandum in Opposition to Blevins'
Motion to Quash.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status
185.00 ~~
T@1

111.00

11687
TIME
Jensen
04/02/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: attend Sup plementstl
Proceeding; meet with Judge Medley;
attempt to meet with Judge Dever's
clerks; meet with Larry Gobelman re
expediting hearing on Motion to Quash.

1.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

222.00

20.00

20.00

11756
EXP
Jensen
04/04/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Expenses: Garnishment Fee.

2

Slip Value

11715
TIME
Jensen
04/05/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: telephone
conversation with Judge Dever's clerk to
schedule a hearing on Motion to Quash;
draft, file, and serve Notice of Hearing;
review Dunn's postjudgment discovery
requests; research issue of postjudgment
discovery; confer by telephone with a
retired judge on the issue; draft, file and
serve Motion and Memorandum for
Protective Order.

2.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

388.50

11730
TIME
Jensen
Collections
04/08/02
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Collection Activities: Litigation: telephone
conversation with Client re hearing this
Friday.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

55.50

11753
TIME
Jensen
04/10/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: telephone call from
Custom's Bankruptcy attorney in Idaho re
hearing and appearance of Blevins;
telephone conversation with Client re

0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

74.00

S ^

04/11/02
2:10 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
same.

User
Activity
Client
Reference

11755
TIME
04/11/02
WIP
Collection Activities: receive and review
Notice of Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond
faxed to me by Dunn; review Rule 62 re
stays and supersedeas bonds; draft
Motion for Augmented Judgment,
including an Affidavit of Attorney Fees
and Costs; file same with Court; Draft
Bench Warrant consistent with Court's
Order of 4/2/2002; obtain same from
Court.

Jensen
Collections
Custom3 Blevins

Page

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

1.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

259.00

10.00

10.00

11757
EXP
Jensen
04/11/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Expenses: Service of Process
to Serve US Bank with Writ of
Garnishment.

Grand Total
Billable
Unbillable
Total

10.00
0.00
10.00

1922.00
0.00
1922.00
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

2>f

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk 238-7480, In-Court Clerk 238-7464/77325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,

DENIAL OF FIRST ORDER AND
JUDGMENT TO AUGMENT
ORIGINAL JUDGMENT

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

Defendants.
The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motion to Augment Judgment and its
supporting Affidavit of Attorney Fees, and finding w opposition to the motion, denies the Jh
rN>Tw j ^ W \ N b ^ MX^^V^SVV^K
Motion &»4^^tsAA

.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that no additional judgment be
entered against Plaintiffs m favor of Defendants in the amount of $2,107.
DATED this Q2* day o f ^ ^ ^ j v -

Jud|
Third Distinct Court Judge
Custom\Blevms3\Order to Augment Judgment April 30, 2002

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the
foregoing DENIAL OF FIRST ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO AUGMENT
ORIGINAL JUDGMENT by mailing a copy to:
Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315

DATED this 25th day of July 2002.

MICHAEL A. JENS|sj/, Esq.

Custom\Blevins3\Order to Augment Judgment April 30,2002

2

Tab 9
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RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3800

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STEVEN BLEVINS and DEBRA KAY
BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.,

OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER AND
NOTICE TO SUBMIT RE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
AUGMENT JUDGMENT

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC.,
a Utah corporation, CONTRACTING
FABRICATION MACHINING, INC., a
Case No. 000906072-CN
dissolved Utah corporation, RANDY
ISAACSON, LINDA I. ISAACSON,
Honorable Judge Dever
HEIDI BISHOP, JASON BISHOP,
District Judge
WENDY GARAMENDI, and MARK
GARAMENDI, and JOHN DOES I-X
I
Defendants.
|

The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501,
UCJA, hereby submit to the Court their objection to both the notice to submit and the form of
order on Defendants' Motion to Augment Judgment.
ARGUMENT
A. The Notice to Submit,
Notwithstanding the Defendants' representation that "[n]o opposition memorandum has
been filed, one has been filed, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A".

B. The Order.
Since the Court has not yet ruled on the Defendants' motion and determined the
reasonableness of fees, the recitals "finding no opposition to the motion" and "finding that such
fees are reasonable under all the circumstances" are incorrect. Moreover, since there is not yet
a finding of reasonableness, the inclusion of the amount, $2,107, is inappropriate.
DATED May 3, 2002,

Ronald L. Dunn, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on May 3, 2002, I deposited in the United States Mails, postage prepaid,
copies of the above-described document and this Certificate, addressed to:
Michael A. Jensen, Esq.

2

RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STEVEN BLEVINS and DEBRA KAY
BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs..
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC.,
a Utah corporation, CONTRACTING
FABRICATION MACHINING, INC., a
dissolved Utah corporation, RANDY
ISAACSON, LINDA I. ISAACSON,
HEIDI BISHOP, JASON BISHOP,
WENDY GARAMENDI, and MARK
GARAMENDI, and JOHN DOES I-X
1
Defendants.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO AUGMENT JUDGMENT
Case No. 000906072-CN
Honorable Judge Dever
District Judge

|

:

-j

The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501,
UCJA, hereby submit to the Court their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Augment Judgment.
ARGUMENT
Given Defendants' Counsel's length of experience in the practice of law, the fact that he
offices in his home and has next to no overhead, the lack of difficulty of the post-judgment issues

Exhibit" J;*1

*

"" -J ~ . i - -

herein, the rates charged and the amount of time allegedly incurred are excessive.
DATED April 22, 2002.

Ronald L. Dunn, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on April 22, 2002,1 deposited in the United States Mails, postage prepaid,
copies of the above-described document and this Certificate, addressed to:
Michael A. Jensen, Esq.
PO Box 571708
(730 Three Ftns. # 87)
SLC,

